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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
Aundel Benoit appeals his conviction for aiding and 
abetting and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to 
United States jurisdiction. We will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence.  
 
I. 
On April 12, 2010, the vessel “Laurel” was intercepted 
in international waters by the United States Coast Guard. 
Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the United States and 
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Grenada, was the master of the Laurel. The Laurel was 
registered in the United States. 
 
The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, who learned from 
British Virgin Island law enforcement authorities, who in turn 
learned from Grenadian law enforcement authorities, that the 
Laurel may be smuggling illegal narcotics. On the basis of 
this information, a law enforcement detachment from the U.S. 
Coast Guard cutter “Reef Shark” boarded the Laurel to 
investigate. Officers proceeded to conduct a routine safety 
inspection, which the Laurel passed. Officers then attempted 
to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection,1 but 
were unable to complete it because rough waters made areas 
of the vessel inaccessible. On board, Officer Riemer 
questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their 
destination and purpose for travel. Officer Riemer also 
conducted several ION scan swipes of the vessel.2 None of 
                                              
1 Coast Guard Officer Robert Riemer testified at the 
suppression hearing that a space accountability inspection  
consists of . . . taking measurements of the boat, 
both exterior, interior, accounting for the length 
of the boat, the width of the boat, the 
dimensions of each compartment in the boat. 
The reason that’s done is to try to 
determine if there’s [sic] any hidden 
compartments or spaces where contraband 
might be secreted away.  
J.A. vol. II, JA53-54. 
2 Officer Riemer explained at the suppression hearing that 
[w]hen you conduct an ION scan, you 
take a small piece of filter paper and you’ll take 
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the swipes came back positive for any explosive, contraband, 
or narcotics. 
 
Due to low fuel, the Reef Shark detachment handed 
over boarding to a second Coast Guard cutter, the “Farrallon.” 
Officers from the Farrallon conducted their own safety 
inspection but were still unable to complete the space 
accountability inspection due to rough seas. On board, 
Lieutenant Mark Aguilar questioned Benoit about his voyage. 
Benoit provided inconsistent responses. Lieutenant Aguilar 
also performed ION scan swipes throughout the vessel, which 
came back negative.  
 
The Farrallon then directed the Laurel to the nearest 
U.S. port: King’s Wharf, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. Once 
there, a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) canine was 
brought on board the Laurel and alerted to the presence of 
narcotics. The next day, on April 13, 2010, officers again 
attempted to perform a space accountability inspection but 
could not get access to all areas of the vessel. In light of these 
developments, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to 
                                                                                                     
a section of the boat, say ten foot by ten foot, . . 
. and you’ll run the piece of filter paper across 
that surface. 
Then you’ll package it in a Ziploc bag, 
label each individual Ziploc bag of where you 
tested, and then that’s sent to the [Coast Guard 
cutter] Reef Shark. The Reef Shark has a device 
on board that allows it to test those pieces of 
filter paper for traces of narcotics, contraband 
and explosives.  
J.A. vol. II, JA52-53.  
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Independent Boat Yard in St. Thomas so that CBP could use 
a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) machine 
to search for anomalies in the vessel. After arriving at 
Independent Boat Yard, a second canine was brought on 
board the Laurel. It too alerted to the presence of narcotics in 
the same area as the first canine. Significantly, a search by the 
VACIS machine showed anomalous masses mid-ship and in 
the stern. A CBP officer drilled a hole in the stern and found a 
substance that field-tested positive for cocaine. Officers cut a 
larger hole in the stern, revealing an area filled with brick-like 
packages. These 250 packages were placed in boxes, turned 
over to CBP, and secured in an evidence vault. Shortly 
thereafter, these boxes were turned over to the DEA for 
delivery to the DEA Southeast Laboratory for analysis. 
Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine 
hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. 
 
Benoit and Williams were indicted on three counts: (1) 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms 
or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States (46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 
70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); 
(2) aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute 
five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States (46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 
70506(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), 
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); and (3) attempted importation of 
cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 952(a), 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), 963). 
Benoit and Williams moved to suppress their arrests and all 
evidence found on the vessel, alleging violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. After the District Court denied the 
motion, defendants filed a second motion to suppress, 
alleging their Fourth Amendment rights were violated in the 
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receipt of evidence obtained from Grenadian authorities. That 
motion was also denied. 
 
Benoit was found guilty on Counts One and Two3 and 
was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, five years’ 
supervised release, and a $200 special assessment.  
 
II. 
On appeal, Benoit asserts the court erred by (A) 
denying his motion to suppress evidence of his arrest and of 
the narcotics found on the Laurel and his motion to suppress 
evidence obtained from Grenadian authorities, (B) denying 
his motion for acquittal, and (C) denying his motion for 
mistrial due to a statement made by the prosecutor in 
summation.4 
 
A. 
 Benoit contends his arrest and the search of the Laurel 
were based on an “anonymous tip” from Grenadian law 
enforcement authorities and that the government did not 
proffer evidence as to the factual basis for, or the reliability 
of, this tip. Benoit also contends the government failed to 
establish that it obtained evidence properly pursuant to the 
terms of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the 
United States and Grenada.5  
                                              
3 The government dismissed Count 3 against Benoit. 
4 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District 
Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
5 “We review a district court’s order denying a motion to 
suppress under a mixed standard of review. We review 
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1. 
 Benoit contends officers violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by arresting him and searching his vessel 
without probable cause. We will assume, for the purpose of 
our discussion, that the Fourth Amendment applies when a 
U.S. citizen is subject to a search by U.S. officers on 
international waters. Cf. United States v. Boynes, 149 F.3d 
208, 212 (3d Cir. 1998) (assuming, arguendo, that the Fourth 
Amendment governs searches of U.S. citizens in foreign 
countries by U.S. officials). Moreover, we will assume that 
Benoit has standing to assert a privacy interest in the part of 
the vessel where the illegal narcotics were found.6 
 
Congress has granted the U.S. Coast Guard broad 
authority to board vessels on the open seas. Section 89(a) of 
Title 14 of the United States Code provides that for the 
purposes of preventing, detecting, and suppressing violations 
of laws of the United States, “officers may at any time go on 
board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the 
                                                                                                     
findings of fact for clear error, but we exercise plenary review 
over legal determinations.” United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 
232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
6 We have not ruled on whether the captain of a ship has a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in a secret 
compartment located in the stern of a vessel. Cf. United States 
v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 149 F.3d 212, 215 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“Third Circuit precedent is inconclusive regarding whether 
the captain of a ship can have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the public areas of his vessel . . . , and an analysis 
of explicit positions taken by our sister courts of appeals on 
this issue fails to reveal any consistent doctrine.”). 
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operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries 
to those on board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, 
and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all 
necessary force to compel compliance.” This statute has been 
construed to permit the Coast Guard to stop an American 
vessel in order to conduct “a document and safety inspection 
on the high seas, even in the absence of a warrant or suspicion 
of wrongdoing,” United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131 
(1st Cir. 1980), and to conduct a more intrusive search on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion, see United States v. Wright-
Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 176 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that “a 
reasonable suspicion requirement for searches and seizures on 
the high seas survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny”), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 
United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d 
Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 
149 F.3d 212, 216-17 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We have previously 
joined our sister courts of appeals in interpreting section 89(a) 
to allow searches of vessels for criminal activities based upon 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”).7  
                                              
7 In Wright-Barker, we noted that the Fifth Circuit held the 
Constitution requires “reasonable suspicion in order to search 
private areas of the hold.” 784 F.2d at 176 n.14 (citing United 
States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 
banc)). We nonetheless posited that “an argument may be 
made that searches on the high seas may be conducted on 
even less cause than reasonable suspicion.” Id. However, 
since reasonable suspicion existed in Wright-Barker, we did 
not have occasion then—nor have we had occasion since—to 
“decide whether any lesser standard is constitutionally 
permissible when vessels are seized and searched due to 
suspicion of contraband smuggling.” Id. 
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Reasonable suspicion, in turn, “‘must be more than a 
mere generalized suspicion or hunch. Reasonable suspicion 
must be based on specific articulable facts, together with 
rational inferences drawn from those facts, which reasonably 
warrant suspicion of criminal activity. Law enforcement 
officers may subjectively assess those facts in light of their 
expertise.’” Varlack Ventures, Inc., 149 F.3d at 217 (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1430 
(11th Cir. 1989)). “[W]e examine the totality of the 
circumstances to determine reasonable suspicion . . . .” Id. 
(quoting Roy, 869 F.2d at 1430). 
 
Benoit contends the Coast Guard did not have 
reasonable suspicion because officers stopped the Laurel on 
the basis of an anonymous tip that lacked any indicia of 
reliability. The record does not reflect the basis for Grenadian 
authorities’ belief that the Laurel was smuggling contraband. 
Regardless, we find it was reasonable for the U.S. Coast 
Guard to rely on the information received by Grenadian 
authorities.  
 
In United States v. Mathurin, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agents conducted a search on the basis 
of a tip they received from a Customs and Border Protection 
aircraft. 561 F.3d 170, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2009). In considering 
the defendant’s challenge that the tip was not sufficiently 
reliable to justify the search, we explained that “[w]e need not 
undertake the established legal methods for testing the 
reliability of this tip because a tip from one federal law 
enforcement agency to another implies a degree of expertise 
and a shared purpose in stopping illegal activity, because the 
agency’s identity is known.” Id. at 176. The instant case 
presents a similar situation because the information on which 
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the U.S. Coast Guard relied came from authorities with whom 
our country has a working relationship to prevent drug 
trafficking. See Agreement Concerning Maritime Counter-
Drug Operations, U.S.-Gren., ¶ 1, May 16, 1995, T.I.A.S. 
12648 (declaring that the United States and Grenada “shall 
cooperate in combatting illicit maritime drug traffic to the 
fullest extent possible”).8  
 
 Moreover, the information from Grenadian authorities 
passes muster even if we were to apply “established legal 
methods for testing [it’s] reliability.” Mathurin, 561 F.3d at 
176. The working relationship between Grenada and the 
United States bolsters the credibility of the information, since 
the Grenadian authorities’ “reputation can be assessed,” and 
they “can be held responsible if [their] allegations turn out to 
be fabricated.” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000). And 
as the Supreme Court has explained,“[i]nformants’ tips . . . 
may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple 
rule will not cover every situation. . . . [I]n some situations[,] . 
. . when a credible informant warns of a specific impending 
crime[, ]the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an 
appropriate police response.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 147 (1972). Given that the source here was not only 
known to the DEA, but was also a repeat-player in the United 
States’ efforts at drug-trafficking prevention, we hold the 
information had sufficient indicia of reliability to establish 
reasonable suspicion that the Laurel was transporting 
narcotics.  
 
                                              
8 We may take judicial notice of a treaty and its terms. United 
States ex rel. Reichel v. Carusi, 157 F.2d 732, 733 (3d Cir. 
1946). 
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In addition, other factors—which became apparent 
after the Coast Guard lawfully boarded the Laurel to conduct 
a routine document and safety inspection—gave rise to 
reasonable suspicion to search. As the District Court 
explained, Benoit’s conversations with Coast Guard officers 
“left the Coast Guard—or certainly would leave the 
reasonable observer with some doubt as to the reliability of 
the information obtained, because some of the information 
was suspicious, or otherwise there were some inconsistencies 
that gave the agents some pause.” J.A. vol. II, JA239; see also 
United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“Our cases have identified a number of factors that may 
contribute to an officer’s reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity justifying detention. One factor is an individual’s 
internally inconsistent statements . . . regarding travel 
plans.”). The District Court did not err in crediting Lieutenant 
Aguilar’s testimony and finding that Benoit made inconsistent 
statements regarding the purpose and destination of his 
voyage.9 See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d 
                                              
9 According to testimony at the suppression hearing, Officer 
Riemer first asked questions of Benoit and Williams. When 
the Farrallon detachment replaced the Reef Shark 
detachment, Lieutenant Aguilar asked questions of Benoit 
and Williams. Aguilar testified the following discrepancies 
occurred: 
 
• Benoit told Officer Riemer that in order to pick up spare 
parts for the vessel’s generator, he was headed to Virgin 
Gorda. Benoit told Lieutenant Aguilar he was headed to 
Tortola for this purpose.  
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Cir. 1997) (explaining that the clearly erroneous standard of 
review “is more deferential with respect to determinations 
about the credibility of witnesses,” particularly “when the 
district court’s decision is based on testimony that is coherent 
and plausible”). 
 
Thus, the information from Grenadian authorities and 
defendant’s inconsistent statements were sufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion that supported the officers’ 
decision to briefly detain the Laurel and search the vessel for 
contraband. And since officers had reasonable suspicion to 
suspect contraband on board the Laurel but rough seas 
prevented them from completing an inspection that would 
confirm or dispel their suspicion, the officers acted properly 
in detaining the Laurel at King’s Wharf, approximately fifty 
miles from the original detention site, for the reasonable 
amount of time it took to complete their search. Cf. United 
                                                                                                     
• Benoit stated the vessel departed from Grenada on April 
9th, but a customs document on board stated the vessel 
was cleared on April 7th.  
• Benoit claimed that after obtaining spare parts, his final 
destination was the Dominican Republic. He stated he 
was going there to visit family and to look for artists for 
the next year’s jazz festival. Lieutenant Aguilar inquired 
after Benoit’s family and learned that most of his 
relatives lived in Grenada or the United States. 
Lieutenant Aguilar then asked whom in Benoit’s family 
actually lived in the Dominican Republic. In response, 
Benoit stated he was going to the Dominican Republic 
to check on a house they recently built there, to see 
friends, and to look for artists for next year’s jazz 
festival. 
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States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that once officers had probable cause to search a 
vessel, it was not unreasonable to ask the crew of the vessel to 
travel to a harbor forty miles away in order to conduct the 
search).  
 
Once at King’s Wharf, a canine positively alerted to 
the presence of narcotics on board the Laurel. And officers 
again attempted but were unable to account for all spaces on 
the vessel. These factors prompted officers to x-ray the 
vessel. The anomalous masses identified by the x-ray then led 
a CBP officer to drill into the stern, where he discovered a 
substance that field-tested positive for cocaine. We find that 
law enforcement acted appropriately at each of these steps in 
the investigation. “In the maritime context, the relative 
intrusiveness of a search must be justified by a corresponding 
level of suspicion supported by specific facts gathered by 
investigating officials.” United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 
F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1993). In this case, following Lieutenant 
Aguilar’s interview with Benoit, every action taken by law 
enforcement confirmed, rather than dispelled, officers’ 
reasonable suspicions and provided the basis for more 
intrusive searches of the vessel.10 The most invasive action 
                                              
10 Since Benoit did not provide any information about the 
reliability of ION scans, we cannot find that reasonable 
suspicion was dispelled by the negative results to those tests. 
Cf. United States v. Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars & 
No Cents in U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215, 231 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting the evidentiary significance of ION scan evidence 
where proffering party failed to explain the reliability of the 
test or why results were scientifically significant, among other 
things). 
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taken by law enforcement—drilling into the stern of the 
vessel—was proper under the circumstances. The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held in a similar context that 
“‘reasonable suspicion’ may be formed on the basis of facts 
obtained during the safety and document inspection, and once 
reasonable suspicion exists the inspecting officers may drill 
into a suspicious area to search for contraband.” Cardona-
Sandoval, 6 F.3d at 23.  
 
In summary, we find both the seizure of Benoit and the 
search of the Laurel were supported by reasonable suspicion. 
We also agree with the District Court that once the canine 
alerted to the presence of narcotics on the vessel, probable 
cause existed to arrest Benoit.11 Cf. United States v. Massac, 
                                              
11 The record shows that Benoit was placed in the back of a 
CBP vehicle upon his arrival at Independent Boat Yard, 
which occurred after a canine positively alerted to the 
presence of narcotics. The District Court determined he was 
not free to leave at this point and had effectively been 
arrested. The record is unclear as to whether Benoit was free 
to leave at other points during his encounter with law 
enforcement authorities. Regardless, the temporary detention 
of Benoit was reasonable under the circumstances. 
Investigatory stops on the high seas present unique challenges 
that the Fourth Amendment may accommodate, particularly 
when the safety of law enforcement and/or the vessel’s 
occupants is at stake. The District Court found the officers 
were unable to complete their space accountability inspection 
on the high seas. Ample testimony supported this finding. 
Given the circumstances, the officers acted properly by 
detaining Benoit and the Laurel at a nearby harbor in order to 
complete the inspection. Cf. United States v. Roberson, 90 
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867 F.2d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 1989) (“When the alert was given 
by the dog, we are satisfied that, at least when combined with 
the other known circumstances, probable cause existed to 
arrest.”). For these reasons, the District Court did not err in 
denying Benoit’s motion to suppress his arrest and the 
evidence seized on the vessel.  
 
2. 
Benoit also contends the government did not abide by 
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) in place 
between the United States and Grenada in obtaining certain 
evidence from Grenadian authorities. On this theory, Benoit 
sought to have the evidence obtained from Grenadian 
authorities suppressed in the District Court.  
 
The Supreme Court has explained that for the 
exclusionary rule to apply, a constitutional violation must 
have been a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence in 
question. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006); 
see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) 
(explaining the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
constitutional violations, not redress injury to a search 
victim). Benoit has not offered any controlling or persuasive 
authority applying the exclusionary rule to a putative 
violation of the MLAT. Moreover, we note that the MLAT 
explicitly states it confers no private rights. See Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Gren., art. 1, ¶ 4, May 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining law enforcement may, 
upon reasonable suspicion, stop and temporarily detain 
citizens short of an arrest (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968))).  
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30, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-24 (“The provisions of this 
Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private 
person to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence . . . .”). 
 
Benoit’s attempt to tie an alleged MLAT violation to a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights also fails. Benoit 
concedes that generally the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to acts of foreign law enforcement, but cites two 
exceptions to this rule from other circuits—when the actions 
of the foreign officials shock the conscience of the court, see 
Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir. 
1965), or when the foreign officials were acting as agents of 
the United States, see United States v. LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 
488, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1989). Since Benoit alleges that 
Grenadian authorities may have obtained the evidence at 
issue in a constitutionally impermissible fashion under one of 
these exceptions, Benoit asserts that “the Government must 
establish that said evidence was obtained in a manner 
consistent with the U.S. Constitution.” Br. for Appellant 
Aundel Benoit 32.  
 
Benoit is mistaken in his assertion of the burden of 
proof. “As a general rule, the burden of proof is on the 
defendant who seeks to suppress evidence.” United States v. 
Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). Only “once the 
defendant has established a basis for his motion” does the 
burden shift to the government to show the search was 
reasonable. Id.; see also United States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 
1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A defendant who seeks to 
suppress evidence bears the burden of making a prima facie 
showing of illegality. Reliance on vague, conclusory 
allegations is insufficient.” (citation omitted)). In this case, 
Benoit has not fulfilled his burden of establishing a basis for 
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his motion; he has offered nothing but conclusory allegations 
that Grenadian authorities may have acted improperly in 
obtaining the information at issue. Thus, the District Court 
did not err in denying Benoit’s second motion to suppress 
evidence.  
 
B. 
Benoit contends the District Court erred in denying his 
motion for acquittal. He asserts that no reasonable jury could 
have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on either 
count because (1) the evidence failed to establish that the 
substance seized from the Laurel was cocaine, and (2) the 
evidence failed to establish that he knew and agreed to 
participate in a specific legal objective.12 
 
1. 
Benoit contends the government’s evidence did not 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance seized 
from his vessel was cocaine. Benoit takes issue with the chain 
of custody and the fact that no cocaine was introduced into 
evidence.  
                                              
12 Our review of a district court’s denial of a motion for 
acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence is plenary. 
United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008). 
“Hence, we apply a particularly deferential standard of 
review, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on the available evidence.” Id. (citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  
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We have explained that  
[t]o establish a chain of custody, the 
government need only show that it took 
reasonable precautions to preserve the evidence 
in its original condition, even if all possibilities 
of tampering are not excluded. Absent actual 
evidence of tampering, a trial court may 
presume regularity in public officials’ handling 
of contraband. Unless the trial court clearly 
abused its discretion, we must uphold its 
decision to admit the cocaine base into 
evidence. 
 
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citations omitted).  
 
In this case, there was ample testimony regarding the 
chain of custody. However, Benoit asserts that one person in 
the chain of custody did not testify. At trial, DEA Agent 
Curtis Lilley testified that he delivered the fourteen boxes of 
narcotics seized from the Laurel, labeled with DEA case 
number KS10-0011, to lab personnel at the DEA Southeast 
Laboratory. Carolyn Hudson, a forensic chemist at the lab, 
testified that pursuant to usual practice, she received the 
fourteen boxes from an evidence technician at the lab and 
prepared a label for the boxes that included the same case 
number assigned by the DEA. Hudson also testified that the 
boxes were sealed when she received them and there was no 
evidence of tampering or alteration. Benoit did not proffer 
any evidence to the contrary. Hudson then testified that she 
analyzed the substance in the boxes and determined it to be 
cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. 
19 
 
 Given this testimony, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that chain of custody had been 
adequately established. See United States v. Rawlins, 606 
F.3d 73, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding “none of the chains at 
issue was so deficient that there was no ‘rational basis’ for 
concluding that the evidence was what the government 
claimed,” where the government failed to proffer evidence as 
to how or from whom a DEA chemist received the substance 
that she determined to be cocaine). Because the evidence of 
chain of custody was sufficient, and Hudson testified the 
substance in the fourteen boxes was cocaine hydrochloride, 
the government did not need to submit the cocaine into 
evidence. See Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“Identification of a controlled substance does not 
require direct evidence if available circumstantial evidence 
establishes its identity beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting 
United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 978 (11th Cir.1984))). 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the 
chain of custody evidence sufficient to support a conviction. 
 
2. 
 Benoit contends the government’s evidence did not 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew of and agreed 
to participate in a specific legal objective. In particular, 
Benoit asserts the government failed to show that he knew 
narcotics were the object of the conspiracy.13  
                                              
13 “To prove a conspiracy, the government must show: (1) a 
shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common 
illegal goal; and (3) an agreement to work toward that goal. 
The government must establish each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It may do so with direct or circumstantial 
20 
 
We recently clarified the standard of review for 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges in this context. See 
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, No. 11-3768, 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16407, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2013) (en 
banc). We explained that we must “examine[] the record in 
each case to determine whether the government put forth 
‘drug-related evidence, considered with the surrounding 
circumstances, from which a rational trier of fact could 
logically infer that the defendant knew a controlled substance 
was involved in the transaction at issue.’” Id. at *19 (quoting 
United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
However, we emphasized that “‘the government may 
circumstantially establish the element of knowledge grain-by-
grain until the scale finally tips.’” Id. (quoting United States 
v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2012)). Most 
importantly, we clarified that  
 
our role as a reviewing court is to uphold the 
jury verdict—and not to usurp the role of the 
jury—as long as it passes the “bare rationality” 
test. Reversing the jury’s conclusion simply 
because another inference is possible—or even 
equally plausible—is inconsistent with the 
proper inquiry for review of sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges, which is that “[t]he 
evidence does not need to be inconsistent with 
every conclusion save that of guilt if it does 
                                                                                                     
evidence. Circumstantial inferences drawn from the evidence 
must bear a logical or convincing connection to established 
fact.” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, No. 11-3768, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16407, at *17-18 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 
2013) (en banc) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
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establish a case from which the jury can find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
 
Id. at *39 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1977)).  
 
In the instant case, the circumstantial evidence 
presented by the government was sufficient for a rational jury 
to decide that “‘the scale finally tip[ped].’” Id. at *45 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Iafelice, 978 
F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1992)). The evidence suggested that 
Benoit had owned the Laurel for several years and that certain 
alterations had been made to it. Given the relatively small size 
of the Laurel and the amount of cocaine it was transporting, 
the jury could have reasoned that Benoit, as the Laurel’s 
master, would have known there were illegal narcotics on 
board. The jury may also have found Benoit’s inconsistent 
statements probative of his criminal intent.  
 
Moreover, in Iafelice, which we cited with approval in 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, we faced a similar scenario involving 
the transportation of narcotics in an automobile. We 
explained that 
 
ownership and operation of the vehicle used to 
transport the drugs . . . . are highly relevant facts 
that could reasonably have been considered by a 
jury in evaluating [the defendant’s] knowledge 
of, and dominion and control over, the drugs. 
Common sense counsels that an owner and 
operator of a vehicle usually has dominion and 
control over the objects in his or her vehicle of 
which he or she is aware, and usually knows 
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what is in that vehicle. 
 
Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97. The same holds true here. See 
Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 171 (“[A] captain is likely to 
know the contents of his ship.”). 
 
In short, we will uphold the decision of the jury given 
that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury 
to rationally infer that Benoit knew the object of the 
conspiracy was a controlled substance.  
 
C. 
Benoit contends the District Court erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial due to the government’s improper 
statement during summation.  
 
During summation, the prosecutor stated the Coast 
Guard had “just saved this country from 250 kilograms” of 
cocaine. J.A. vol. III, JA898. Defense counsel objected and 
moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion and gave a 
curative instruction to the jury, stating  
 
[Y]ou just heard a little while ago, a reference 
to saving the country from 250 kilograms . . . . 
That portion of the argument is improper. That 
is not the basis on which you determine guilt or 
the lack of guilt. So any appeal to that [sic] 
saving the country is improperly before you and 
is to be disregarded. 
 
Id. at JA901. The court also reminded the jury that the 
prosecutor’s comment was not a statement of the law and that 
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the arguments of counsel are not evidence.  
 
“‘We review a district court’s decision not to grant a 
mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor made improper 
remarks in closing argument for abuse of discretion.’” United 
States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 282 
(3d Cir.1999)). Under the factors we identified in United 
States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2003), we find 
the scope of the prosecutor’s comment, within the context of 
the whole trial, was minimal; the curative instruction 
adequately addressed any error; and the evidence of Benoit’s 
guilt, regardless of the prosecutor’s statement, was 
substantial. See also Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 770 
F.2d 343, 351 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding prosecutor’s alleged 
error did not prejudice the defendant in light of the substantial 
evidence of guilt and the curative instructions given to the 
jury). Since we find the prosecutor’s comment was harmless, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Benoit’s motion for mistrial.  
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence.  
